Economic Crisis and Social Trust : reviewing the effects of economic hardship on interpersonal and institutional confidence by Torrente, Diego et al.
 
 
 
 
DOCUMENT DE TREBALL 
 
XREAP2018-7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND SOCIAL TRUST: 
REVIEWING THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC 
HARDSHIP ON INTERPERSONAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE 
 
Diego Torrente 
Jordi Caïs 
Catalina Bolancé (RISKCENTER, XREAP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Economic Crisis and Social Trust:  
Reviewing the effects of economic hardship 
on interpersonal and institutional confidence 
Diego Torrente1, Jordi Cais2 y Catalina Bolancé3 
 
The economic crisis of 2008 led to a significant erosion of trust in those countries that were hit 
hardest. However, whether this fall in trust can best be explained by external economic factors 
or by the lack of response on the part of the institutions to civic needs and demands is unclear. 
This study seeks to address this question by examining the specific case of Spain. Its aim is to 
analyse in comparison with other factors, the effect of increasing socioeconomic precariousness 
upon levels of interpersonal and institutional trust. The study examines the respective impact of 
these factors upon different social groups according to their degree of exposure to the effects of 
the crisis. Our results show that the deterioration suffered by household economies has 
important consequences in terms of interpersonal trust. Those most severely affected by the 
recession lose a great deal of trust in others. We also find that a deterioration in socioeconomic 
conditions has different effects in relation to institutional trust. The perception of the overall 
state of the economy is important for all types of institutional trust. Without calling into 
question the importance of institutional performance on levels of institutional trust, our research 
sheds new light on the importance of different economic factors for social cohesion. 
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Introduction 
This article explores the consequences of the socioeconomic effects brought on by the 
crisis of 2008 upon levels of social distrust. It assesses the extent to which the abrupt 
increase in poverty and inequality has weakened the foundations of social cohesion. It is 
widely known that trust, both in other people and in public institutions, tends to 
deteriorate when socioeconomic conditions worsen (Brooks and Manza 2007; Chanley 
et al. 2001; Polavieja 2013; Dotti Sani and Magistro 2016). However, in the case of 
institutional trust, it is not so clear whether this effect is produced directly by economic 
hardship, or indirectly due to an unsatisfactory response on the part of these institutions 
to increased citizen needs and demands (Newton and Norris 2000). Some recent 
evidence seems to support this second explanation (Torcal 2014; Armingeon and Ceka 
2013), whereas other studies point to the combined role played by the policies of 
international organisations and the citizens’ perception of a deteriorating national 
economy (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014).  
 
Our research seeks to bring new insights to this debate by combining two 
methodological innovations. First, we measure how attitudes of trust change over time 
within different socioeconomic segments of the population to obtain a better 
understanding of variations in trust in relation to the personal situation of citizens (Dotti 
Sani and Magistro 2016). We control for these effects by considering other major 
factors that can strengthen or weaken trust: namely, the degree of development of civil 
society, the degree of community cohesion, and the strength of social values and 
culture. Second, we undertake a joint analysis of changes in interpersonal and 
institutional trust, two variables that while conceptually different are also related 
(Brhem and Rhan 1997; Rothstein 2011; Newton and Norris 2000). Here, we 
specifically wish to observe how they interact during an economic recession. To do so, 
a structural equation model with five dependent variables (interpersonal trust and four 
indicators of institutional trust) is built. In this way, we also control the mutual 
interactions between these variables. The model is replicated for two different time 
points –before and during the crisis– to determine the variations.  
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The effects of the economic crisis on trust in Spain 
The 2008 economic crisis offers an opportunity to better understand the short-term 
impact of economic recession upon social trust. Since the outbreak of the crisis, levels 
of trust have fallen in those European countries that have been worst affected 
(Armingeon and Ceka 2013; Roth, Nowak-Lehmann, and Otter 2013). The Spanish case 
is of particular interest. Spain underwent rapid economic growth from 2000 to 2007 
(3.8% inter-annual average increase), in a period in which it was frequently recognised 
as one of Europe’s most successful economies. However, when the crisis came, the 
recession had a profound impact on people’s daily lives, increasing poverty, inequality 
and uncertainty (Laparra and Pérez 2012; Fundación Foessa 2014). 
 
In Spain, the effects of the economic crisis have been far-reaching. Unemployment, 
which in 2007 stood at nearly 1,760,000 people (7.9% of the active population), reached 
a record high in 2013 with more than 6,200,000 unemployed (27.2%). Youth 
unemployment (the jobless under the age of 25) in that year was recorded at 960,000 
people (57.2%), according to data provided by the Spanish Labour Force Survey (INE 
2013). Spain’s GDP per capita fell from 105% of the European Union average in 2006 
to 95% in 2013 (EUROSTAT 2015). Public debt, which in 2007 was equivalent to 
36.1% of GDP, grew to 93.4% in 2013 (Banco de España 2013). Collectively, these 
trends represent a severe decline in quality of life, further confirmed by the fall in 
average household income from 29,634 euros per year in 2009 to 26,174 in 2013, 
according to the Spanish Income and Living Conditions Survey (INE 2015). Income 
inequalities between Spaniards also increased sharply. The crisis affected the whole 
population, but the poor lost much more than the wealthy: between 2008 and 2011, the 
poorest 10% of the country saw their annual incomes drop 42.4%, whilst the richest 
10% saw a reduction of only 5.6% over the same period. According to the Income 
Inequality Update (OECD 2014), Spain is the country with the second highest level of 
economic inequality in the European Union, only surpassed by the United Kingdom.  
 
In parallel with the effects of the economic crisis in terms of increased levels of 
“precariousness and inequality”, a significant loss of trust was recorded in public 
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institutions, at a level that was only surpassed by Cyprus and Slovenia, and on a par 
with levels in Portugal and Greece (Fernández de Guevara, Pérez, and Serrano 2015). 
However, indicators of interpersonal trust and solidarity reported a degree of 
improvement. This can be interpreted, a priori, as constituting an interesting 
compensatory mechanism whereby the negative effect of the crisis is mitigated by 
solidarity and interpersonal connections. 
 
Table 1 shows how interpersonal and institutional trust has evolved in Spain before and 
during the economic crisis. For example, between 2010 and 2012, trust in political 
institutions collapsed, at a time when the effects of the economic crisis were at their 
severest. The percentage of people claiming to trust Parliament between 2004 and 2012 
fell from 42 to 21%. Trust in political parties was already low in 2004 (19%), and even 
before the economic recession presented a clear downward trend. But, during the crisis, 
this tendency was exacerbated: in 2012, a mere 7% of the population claimed they still 
trusted Spain’s political parties. A great deal of trust was also eroded in the legal 
system. Before the crisis there had been an upward tendency in trust levels, so that in 
2006, 44% of people claimed to trust the legal system. After 2008, however, this 
percentage fell to reach 25% in 2012. The only institution whose prestige increased 
before and during the crisis was that of the police. Yet, even its levels were affected in 
2012, as protests strengthened. All these movements occurred against a backdrop of 
harsh government economic measures and the subsequent increase in poverty and 
inequality.  
 
In contrast, regardless of the specific indicator employed, levels of interpersonal trust 
tended to be maintained or to even rise slightly between 2004 (pre-crisis) and 2010 
(during the crisis itself). However, in 2012, at the height of the crisis, the proportion of 
people claiming to trust others rose markedly. Thus, while it is no surprise that the 
economic crisis undermined the Spanish people’s trust in their democratic institutions 
(Nannestad 2008; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Zmerli and Castillo 2015), it is indeed a 
surprise that this erosion of trust in institutions was not accompanied by a corresponding 
fall in interpersonal trust (Putnam 2000; Rahn and Transue 1998). 
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Table 1 
Variation of indicators of interpersonal and institutional trust in Spain (2004-
2012) 
(In percentages) 
Distrust indicator: 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Interpersonal:      
Most people can be trusted(a)   39.3% 41.3% 40.1% 41.1% 45.7% 
 (1660) (1870) (2565) (1880) (1887) 
Most people try to be fair(b) 44.5 44.8 45.8 43.4 50.3 
 (1655) (1864) (2550) (1869) (1884) 
Most of the time people are helpful(c) 28.5 27.5 31.1 34.0 35.0 
 (1661) (1870) (2556) (1881) (1881) 
Institutional:      
Parliament(d) 42.1 42.4 41.6 29.6 21.1 
 (1558) (1785) (2376) (1817) (1814) 
Political parties(d) 19.4 16.0 15.1 10.1 7.0 
 (1613) (1832) (2499) (1865) (1870) 
Legal system(d) 36.0 43.7 30.3 32.8 25.1 
 (1611) (1836) (2518) (1844) (1856) 
Police(d) 58.8 61.8 64.1 66.8 58.9 
 (1633) (1861) (2562) (1873) (1877) 
 
Source: European Social Survey. 2004 to 2012 waves. 
 
Note: Answers are recorded on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is the highest feeling of 
distrust and 10 the highest feeling of trust. Scores on both variables from 0 to 4 are 
considered indicative of distrust, 5 is a neutral response, and scores from 6 to 10 are 
indicative of trust. 
(a) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted. or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people?  
(b) Do most people try to take advantage of you if they get a chance or do they try to be fair? 
(c) Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly just 
looking out for themselves? 
(d) How much you personally trust each of the institutions?  
 
 
Literature review 
There is robust evidence indicating that trust is associated with economic equality and 
fair opportunities (Delhey and Newton 2005; Nannestad 2008; Rothstein and Uslaner 
2005; Bergh and Bjørnskov 2014). Countries with high levels of inequality suffer from 
a significant lack of trust in their institutions (Zmerli and Castillo 2015). Indeed, several 
authors maintain that the increasingly unequal distribution of income and wealth is 
responsible for a general reduction in trust (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995). The 
mechanism in operation here seems to be that inequality increases the social distance 
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between individuals, making them believe they have fewer interests in common and, in 
the medium-term, this results in the development of different subcultures (Fairbrother 
and Martin 2013; Rothstein 2011). For example, upwardly mobile social groups 
experience increased levels of trust, and vice versa (Li, Savage, and Warde 2008). 
Inequalities are negatively associated with political trust no matter whether they are 
measured by objective or subjective indicators (Zmerli and Castillo 2015). At the 
individual level, there is also evidence that situations of socioeconomic difficulty, such 
as unemployment, are associated with increased distrust (Iravani and Dindar 2011). 
Although there is a broad consensus in the literature regarding the importance of 
inequality, not all studies are equally conclusive. Bergh and Bjørnskov (2014), for 
example, find that low levels of social trust have a more direct impact on inequality.  
 
Some of the most recent studies of the effects of the 2008 crisis support the central role 
played by the economic variables. The rise in unemployment in Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland, and, especially, in Spain, contributed markedly to a pronounced fall in 
institutional trust (Roth, Nowak-Lehmann, and Otter 2013). Trust in the European 
Parliament also fell in the peripheral European countries. This decline was more 
pronounced among subjects of lower social status (Dotti Sani and Magistro 2016). As a 
result of the EU’s economic adjustment programme, citizens in crisis-hit countries 
appear to have become ‘detached’ from their democratic political system (Armingeon, 
Guthmann, and Weisstanner 2016). Nevertheless, in this regard, other studies stress the 
importance of institutional performance (Norris 2000; Torcal 2014; Armingeon and 
Ceklca 2013). 
 
Two methodological issues need to be addressed if more definitive conclusions are to be 
reached about the link between economic hardship and distrust. First, most studies 
undertake comparative analyses within a determined period, but only a few are 
longitudinal (Fairbrother and Martin 2013; Armingeon and Guthmann 2014; 
Armingeon, Guthmann, and Weisstanner 2016; Caïs, Folguera, and Formoso 2014). 
Moreover, many of these studies were conducted in times of relative economic stability 
and not in situations of acute crisis. More specifically, the results of cross-national 
studies, based on state-level indicators, may be influenced by other cultural and 
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historical factors, whereas longitudinal studies measuring variations in trust at different 
points in the economic trajectory of a single country are more reliable in this respect. 
Second, the effect of inequality on attitudes of distrust should be more visible among 
the disadvantaged segments of society. Thus, in order to obtain more reliable evidence, 
variations in trust need to be studied in a disaggregated fashion in different segments of 
the population (Dotti Sani and Magisgtro 2016).  
 
The effects of socioeconomic inequalities on institutional and interpersonal trust have 
generally been studied separately. Yet, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that, at the 
national level (if not at the individual level), interpersonal trust and confidence in 
institutions are strongly associated (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Newton and Norris 2000; 
Rothstein 2011; Searing 2013). While conceptually different, the two variables appear 
to be indirectly connected: interpersonal trust can help build effective social and 
political institutions, which can help governments perform effectively, which in turn 
encourages confidence in civic institutions (Newton and Norris 2000). In short, the two 
would appear to be mutually supportive (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Rothstein 2011). 
 
Besides the prevailing socioeconomic conditions, other factors may also influence 
levels of interpersonal and institutional trust and need to be taken into account when 
explaining variations in trust. Indeed, the literature identifies four other major factors 
that can strengthen or weaken trust levels (Nannestad 2008). These factors are (a) the 
degree of development of civil society; (b) the degree of community cohesion; (c) social 
values and culture, and (d) the performance of institutions. In the following paragraphs, 
we summarise the main findings on how they might influence confidence. 
 
The degree of development of civil society has received enormous attention. The 
existence of mature civil societies is a reflection of, but also a condition for, flourishing 
mutual trust. Putnam (1993) notes that individuals learn civic virtues and how to trust 
within the framework of their personal relationships, mostly from those into which they 
enter voluntarily. Reciprocal exchanges inspire greater trust and emotional attachment 
when they are spontaneous than when they are negotiated (Molm, Takahashi, and 
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Peterson 2000). Individuals with a richer network of social relationships tend to place 
more trust in others than do those who live more isolated lives. Thus, people who have 
enjoyed greater success in life tend to trust others more readily or, at least, they are 
more inclined to trust others owing to their own positive personal experiences (Delhey 
and Newton 2003; Buskens 1998). Furthermore, an important connection exists 
between levels of interpersonal trust and civic participation. As the groups and 
organisations of civil society mediate between citizens and the state, this increased 
social capital, in turn, leads to more effective public institutions (Newton and Norris 
2000).  
 
The degree of social cohesion is another factor that needs to be considered. A bi-
directional relationship exists between social order and trust (Delhey and Newton 
2005), with individuals demonstrating greater trust when they can expect a just, stable 
social framework, and vice versa (Misztal 1996). Delinquency (Halpern 2001; Thomé 
and Torrente 2003), or the fear of it (Walklate 1998; Torrente 2001), also has an impact 
on social trust. Finally, some studies have demonstrated the importance of social 
cohesion and the effectiveness of informal social control (collective efficacy) in the 
establishment of community safety (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999).  
 
Cultural theories suggest that social values influence the degree to which individuals 
trust one another, although these effects are seen only in the medium- and long-term. 
For example, Rahn and Transue (1998) revealed that the rapid growth of materialistic 
values among young North Americans in the 1970s and early 1980s reduced their level 
of trust in other people. Putnam (2000) also points to a decline in social trust in the 
United States and links this with a change in daily lifestyle, citing a lack of spare time, 
the incorporation of women into the labour market, increasing city size and individual 
anonymity, mobility facilitated by the mass use of cars and the influence of technology 
and communication media as factors. Individual and collective levels of optimism are 
also related to levels of trust (Uslaner 2002). From this perspective, and in the long-
term, trust in institutions is based on a system of shared values and a framework of 
interpersonal trust (Uslaner 2002; Citrin 1975).  
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The quality of public institutions and their performance also affect levels of trust 
(Rothstein 2011; Newton and Norris 2000). Lipset and Schneider (1987) stressed that 
the level of institutional trust was most closely related to the influence that the 
institution’s actions had over the economic wellbeing of a given individual. Other 
authors, such as Kramer (1983), indicate that the relative success and prestige of the 
State are also central in determining the level of trust people place in their democratic 
institutions. From an institutional perspective, an effective State creates an environment 
that also encourages interpersonal trust, more so than participation in civil society or 
even the level of equality (Robbins 2011; Newton and Norris 2000). On a comparative 
level, there is evidence to support these ideas. Countries that have a solid legal structure 
and enjoy an effective protection of property can conduct economic transactions more 
easily because the mechanisms that generate social trust are more fluid (Buskens 1998; 
Berggren and Jordahl 2006). Societies that have experienced a rapid process of social 
and economic transformation, such as many Eastern European countries, tend to have 
less confidence in their fellow man. This can be attributed to the fact that social change 
has often affected the personal circumstances of given individuals, and also because it 
becomes imperative to redefine the role of institutions in such contexts (Delhey and 
Newton 2003). 
 
 
Objectives, hypothesis and methodology 
The main objective of this study is to analyse the effect of increased socioeconomic 
difficulties and precariousness on interpersonal and institutional trust against the 
backdrop of a deep economic crisis. The specific case of Spain is examined during the 
2008 crisis. Our aim is to demonstrate the veracity of our central hypothesis: In times of 
intense economic crisis, economic factors, in relation to other contributing factors, gain 
greater significance in explaining fluctuations in levels of institutional and interpersonal 
trust. We work from the premise that an increase in socioeconomic inequalities leads to 
increased polarisation in interpersonal and institutional trust between different social 
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groups. In other words, the degree to which a crisis affects different social groups is a 
dominant factor in explaining the attitudes of these groups to trust.  
 
The objectives and hypothesis of this study make it necessary to measure variations in 
the explanatory capacity of the different factors impacting interpersonal and institutional 
trust over time (Fairbrother and Martin 2013). Economic precariousness must also be 
measured. In order to capture “the effect of the crisis”, we employ a model using 
simultaneous equations, considered at two distinct moments in time. Specifically, we 
compare the years 2004 (pre-crisis) and 2012 (during the crisis). We choose these years 
because of their importance as economic points of reference: In 2004 the Spanish 
economy was at the height of its growth, while in 2012 (just 8 years on) it was in a 
trough of recession. Various socioeconomic indicators are used as explanatory 
variables. The model’s parameters are calculated in relation to a reference category (for 
example, the unemployed vs. the employed), which allows us to compare the variation 
in effects between the two years, and to generate observations on the consequences of 
inequality. The data were obtained from the second and sixth editions of the European 
Social Survey (ESS), for which the sample sizes were 1,663 (ESS2) and 1,889 (ESS6) 
individuals over the age of 15. The sampling method used is two-stage stratified 
probability sampling. The fieldwork was carried out between September 2004 and 
January 2005, and between January and May 2013. 
 
The model employs five indicators as dependent variables: one for interpersonal trust 
and four for institutional trust. The first indicator is the degree to which the surveyed 
subject “believes they can trust others”. The rest measure the level of trust expressed in 
four institutions representing the political order (parties and Parliament) and the 
normative order (the legal system and the police). In this way, we capture different 
dimensions of institutional trust. Several indicators of socioeconomic inequality are 
considered as the independent variable (Rothstein 2011). As an indicator of income, the 
surveyed subject’s opinion of whether their income is sufficient to live comfortably is 
used. Being unemployed is a further factor we incorporate into the model (Iravani and 
Dindar 2011). Two further indicators are added as measures of economic uncertainty: 
the source of the household’s main income and the subject’s category of work contract.  
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The economic crisis may impact on trust not only in terms of rising inequalities, but it 
may also result in the deterioration, for instance, of social capital and social values. To 
control for these effects, the design incorporates various indicators related to factors 
identified in the theoretical framework. As a variable of participation in civil society, 
the model indicates whether the subject has worked in a tertiary sector organisation or 
similar (Putnam 1993). Likewise, tolerance is a social value linked with trust (Putnam 
2000); for this reason, the model uses tolerance of immigration as a control element. 
Delinquency is often used as an indicator of the level of social cohesion (Halpern 2001; 
Walklate 2009); therefore, the experience of having been the victim of a robbery in the 
street or a burglary is incorporated into the model. The degree to which institutions are 
able to respond to citizens’ expectations is an important factor for the construction of 
social trust (Torcal 2014); but, unfortunately, the ESS does not include any questions 
about institutional performance. Finally, some key socio-demographic variables are also 
incorporated, including gender, age, level of education, place on political spectrum (left-
wing or right-wing), whether the subject is native to Spain or not, and degree of 
religiosity.  
 
In conducting the data analysis, the model considers apparently related simultaneous 
equations, which take into account the fact that the dependent variables are 
dichotomous. All in all, however, the model allows us to analyse interpersonal and 
institutional trust in a comprehensive manner.  
 
In this study, we are interested in analysing five indicators of trust, where 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗∗, 𝑗𝑗 =1, … ,5 are the five continuous random variables whose values measure the degree of 
trust in 𝑗𝑗. Our objective is to consider the following multivariate model consisting of 
five related regression equations through their random errors: 
 
𝑌𝑌1
∗ = 𝑥𝑥′𝛽𝛽1 + 𝜀𝜀1 
𝑌𝑌2
∗ = 𝑥𝑥′𝛽𝛽2 + 𝜀𝜀2 
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𝑌𝑌3
∗ = 𝑥𝑥′𝛽𝛽3 + 𝜀𝜀3 
𝑌𝑌4
∗ = 𝑥𝑥′𝛽𝛽4 + 𝜀𝜀4  
𝑌𝑌5
∗ = 𝑥𝑥′𝛽𝛽5 + 𝜀𝜀5 
 
where 4𝑥𝑥 = (𝑥𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘)′ is the vector of explanatory variables, which in our models are 
the same for each dependent variable, although they could be different; 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 =
�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗1, … ,𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘�′, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,5, are the vectors of parameters associated with the explanatory 
variables; and 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,5, are random errors that are distributed as standard normal 
and are correlated to each other. 
 
In practice, the level of trust, 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗∗, cannot be measured as a continuous variable. This is 
because, in our case, individuals are asked to locate themselves on a subjective scale 
between 0 and 10. This means that the methods used to estimate the parameters of the 
model defined in (1), which are based on the idea that the joint distribution of the 
dependent variables is a multivariate normal distribution, do not maintain their optimal 
properties. 
 
Modelling the univariate or multivariate behaviour of five categorical or ordinal 
variables is extremely difficult and requires especially large samples to guarantee that 
all categories (in our case 11) have enough sample information. For this reason, we 
chose to simplify the problem and to use a model with binary dependent variables that 
measure whether individuals trust or do not trust other people and institutions, 
considering that in Spain a score of five or above is believed to be a “pass”.  
 
For 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,5, the levels of trust measured, so: 
                                                          
4′ Indicates the transpose of the vector. 
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𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = �≥ 5 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗∗ > 0 < 5 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗∗ ≤ 0, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,5. 
In addition, if the level of trust indicated is five or more, the following binary variables 
are defined: 
𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 = �= 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗∗ > 0, 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑗𝑗               = 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗∗ ≤ 0, 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖′𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑗𝑗 , 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,5. 
Finally, we model the collective probability of the individual trusting all five items 
under analysis. This model, the Probit multivariate model, in our case is expressed as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦1 = 1, 𝑦𝑦2 = 1,𝑦𝑦3 = 1,𝑦𝑦4 = 1,𝑦𝑦5 = 1) = Φ5(𝑥𝑥′𝛽𝛽1,𝑥𝑥′𝛽𝛽2, 𝑥𝑥′𝛽𝛽3,𝑥𝑥′𝛽𝛽4, 𝑥𝑥′𝛽𝛽5;𝑅𝑅)   (1) 
where Φ5(·;𝑅𝑅) is the cumulative probability function of a multivariate standard normal 
(dimension 5), with a correlation matrix of 𝑅𝑅.  
 
It is important to note that if R is not an identity and it presents positive correlations (as 
it does in our case), we underestimate the standard errors of the estimated parameters 
when using univariate estimations for each dependent variable. When the standard 
errors are underestimated, individual inference is affected, leading us to conclude that a 
parameter is non-zero when, in fact, it is not.  
 
The estimation of the vectors of parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 = �𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗1, … ,𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘�′, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,5, is 
conducted by maximising the logarithm of the likelihood function of the model. Greene 
(1999) has described this process in detail. The interpretation of the parameters under 
consideration, β�j = �β�j1, … , β�jk�′, j = 1, … ,5, is completed in the same way as if five 
univariate and independent Probit or Logit models were being estimated. 
 
In order to estimate the model specified in (1), we cleaned the raw data and eliminated 
observations with no values among the explanatory variables included in the model. By 
so doing the sample sizes fell to 1,155 individuals in 2004 and 1,518 in 2012. After this 
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data refinement, the weighting of the observations in the sample were corrected in such 
a way to guarantee the representativeness of the original sample. Furthermore, given 
that we only had information for all observations in the original sample about gender 
and age, we used these two variables to ensure that its distribution before and after the 
refinement process did not change significantly. Besides, we analysed all variables 
included in the model and checked that all the categories were sufficiently 
representative.  
 
 
 
Results 
In this section, we present the descriptive statistics and the estimation results of the 
multivariate model specified in (1). Table 2 shows the mean and the standard deviation 
(STD) of the dependent variables in our multivariate model. We tested the significance 
of the variations of means before and during the economic crisis. Trust in the 
Parliament, the Political Parties, the Legal System and the Police all fall significantly 
(the first three at the 1% and the last at the 5% confidence levels). Conversely, trust in 
other people increases slightly between 2004 and 2012.  
Table 2 
 Descriptive analysis of the dependent variables. 
Variables: 
2004 2012 
N Mean STD N Mean STD 
Trust in other people* 1155 0.676 0.469 1518 0.705 0.457 
Trust in Parliament*** 1155 0.719 0.451 1518 0.381 0.486 
Trust in Political Parties*** 1155 0.442 0.498 1518 0.147 0.355 
Trust in the Legal System*** 1155 0.598 0.492 1518 0.389 0.488 
Trust in the Police** 1155 0.786 0.411 1518 0.757 0.430 
Source: European Social Survey 2004 and 2012 waves. 
Notes: Confidence levels: *10%, **5% and ***1% 
 
The explanatory variables included in our multivariate model are described in Table 3. 
We also test the significance of the mean differences of these variables recorded before 
and during the crisis. Given the changes in the distributions of three of these variables, 
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namely “Feeling about household’s income”, “Unemployment within last 5 years” and 
“Main source of household’s income”, we detect a clear economic deterioration and 
greater uncertainty. Specifically, between 2004 and 2012 the number of people living 
without financial difficulties decreases while people living with difficulties increases. 
This is accompanied by an increase in unemployment in the last five years. As for the 
sources of household income, earnings based on employment decrease at the expense of 
unemployment benefits and social assistance. This is accompanied by an increase in the 
number of pensioners. Consequently, a marked fall (from 47.5 to 6%) in satisfaction 
with the state of the economy was registered. All this implies greater economic 
precariousness and uncertainty in 2012 with respect to 2004. Cohesion and social order, 
measured by the indicator “Victim of burglary or assault in the last 5 years”, decreased 
slightly, while, in contrast, civic participation increased. Finally, given the gap in the 
period analysed, some socio-demographics characteristics had changed and we include 
these as control variables. 
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Table 3  
Descriptive analysis of explanatory variables in the multivariate model. 
 2004 2012 
Variables: Mean STD Mean STD 
Feeling about household’s income: Living without difficulties*** 0.392 0.490 0.267 0.443 
Feeling about household’s income: Living with fair income 0.454 0.499 0.440 0.497 
Feeling about household’s income: Living with difficulties*** 0.154 0.362 0.293 0.456 
Unemployment within last 5 years*** 0.136 0.344 0.238 0.426 
Main source of household income: Employed*** 0.649 0.479 0.554 0.498 
Main source of household income: Self employed 0.153 0.361 0.140 0.347 
Main source of household income: Pension** 0.185 0.389 0.220 0.414 
Main source of household income: Unemployed*** 0.009 0.093 0.054 0.227 
Main source of household income: Social assistance*** 0.001 0.034 0.017 0.128 
Main source of household income: Investment or other*** 0.004 0.060 0.015 0.122 
Employment contract duration: Unlimited 0.465 0.500 0.477 0.500 
Employment contract duration: Temporary 0.191 0.395 0.180 0.385 
Employment contract duration: No contract  0.050 0.219 0.053 0.225 
Satisfaction with state of economy in country*** 0.475 0.501 0.060 0.237 
Tolerance: Immigrants make country a better place to live 0.423 0.496 0.438 0.497 
Victim of burglary or assault in the last 5 years** 0.280 0.450 0.309 0.463 
Worked in civic organisation or association in the last 12 months*** 0.197 0.399 0.245 0.431 
Gender (1=Men,0=Women) 0.531 0.501 0.509 0.500 
Age*** 43.110 17.580 46.746 17.227 
Education level: Without studies*** 0.182 0.387 0.103 0.304 
Education level: Primary 0.151 0.359 0.161 0.368 
Education level: Secondary*** 0.449 0.499 0.309 0.463 
Education level: University*** 0.218 0.414 0.173 0.379 
Religiosity: Not religious** 0.156 0.364 0.188 0.391 
Religiosity: Moderately religious*** 0.520 0.501 0.460 0.499 
Religiosity: More religious* 0.324 0.470 0.352 0.478 
Born in Spain*** 0.943 0.233 0.899 0.302 
Political scale self-placement: Centre*** 0.481 0.501 0.398 0.490 
Political scale self-placement: Left*** 0.283 0.452 0.343 0.475 
Political scale self-placement: Right* 0.236 0.426 0.259 0.439 
Source: European Social Survey 2004 and 2012 waves. 
Notes: Confidence levels: *10%, **5% and ***1% 
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The results for the two multivariate models5 before (year 2004) and during (year 2012) 
the crisis are presented in Table 4. The table uses two types of outcome: the estimated 
parameters and the significance levels of the explanatory variables before and during the 
economic crisis, and the significance levels of the test of differences between these 
parameters.6 Estimated parameters are analysed considering both the signs and the 
significance levels.7 We can observe some changes in the effects of some variables 
before and during the crisis. Moreover, these changes differ between the five trust 
indicators analysed as dependent variables. If we consider the variable “Feeling about 
household’s income”, our results show that individuals living with more financial 
difficulties are more distrustful than those living more comfortably. In 2012, suffering 
from economic difficulties produces a significant reduction in interpersonal trust. A 
negative relationship is also found in 2004 for “Trust in the legal system” and “Trust in 
the police”, though this disappears in 2012. From the previous results, we deduce that 
income hardship led to an erosion of trust in other people during the crisis. In contrast, 
trust in legal institutions lost its negative effect during the crisis. If we analyse the 
estimated parameters associated with “Unemployment within last 5 years”, the results 
are very similar to those above, although, in this case, the statistical test of the 
difference between parameters was not conclusive.  
 
 
  
                                                          
5 To check the robustness of the results, we estimated the same models eliminating some of the 
explanatory variables (“Satisfaction with state of economy in country”, “Feeling about household’s 
income” and “Main source of household income”) and checked that the results were robust. The 
value and the statistical significance of the parameters hardly changed. The results are available 
from the authors on request.  
6 The matrix of correlations R� provides information about the dependency between levels of trust 
not captured by the explanatory variables. If these correlations were zero, the optimal method 
would be to use five univariate Probit models. However, the estimated correlations are positive 
and significantly different from zero. 
7 Some variables are not applicable to all individuals in the sample. In these cases, we have added 
an additional category “Not applicable”. For these categories, we have not included the results of 
the estimated parameters or the statistical significances in the tables because they cannot be 
interpreted. 
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Table 4 
Parameter estimation of the 2004 and 2012 models, and test of equality between them (Diff.) 
 Trust in other people Trust in Parliament Trust in Political Parties Trust in the Legal System Trust in the Police 
Variables:  2004 2012 Diff. 2004 2012 Diff. 2004 2012 Diff. 2004 2012 Diff. 2004 2012 Diff. 
Intercept -0.716** 0.520** *** -0.574* -0.191  -1.372*** 
-
1.715*** 
 -0.158 -0.207  0.352 0.252  
Feeling about household's income: Living without difficulties 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  
Feeling about household's income: Living with fair income 0.072 -0.102  -0.056 0.016  0.079 -0.031  -0.112 0.043  -0.080 0.008  
Feeling about household's income: Living with difficulties -0.065 -0.416*** ** -0.089 -0.131 
 -0.087 -0.135  -0.358*** -0.069 ** -0.317** -0.152  
Unemployment within last 5 years -0.160 -0.235**  -0.012 -0.310  -0.072 0.044  -0.241* 0.016 * -0.134 0.061  
Main source of household income: Employed 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  
Main source of household income: Self employed 0.074 0.147  0.052 -0.219** * 0.060 -0.170  0.129 -0.283*** *** 0.236* 0.019 
 
Main source of household income: Pension -0.243* -0.123  -0.200 0.179* ** 0.049 -0.075  -0.149 -0.048  -0.015 -0.194  
Main source of household income: Unemployed -0.369 0.023  0.404 -0.149  0.063 -0.243  0.180 0.019  0.758 -0.161  
Main source of household income: Social assistance 3.939 -0.137  3.123 -0.604*  0.626 0.020  0.142 0.077  2.980 0.187  
Main source of household income: Investment or other 4.642 -0.054  3.052 -0.167  -0.039 0.200  -0.554 -0.437  -0.230 -0.841*** 
 
Employment contract duration: Unlimited 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  
Employment contract duration: Temporary 0.100 0.017  -0.098 0.072  -0.016 0.058  0.071 -0.052  -0.206* 0.019  
Employment contract duration: No contract  0.340* -0.075 ** 0.116 0.108  -0.411** 0.334* *** -0.517*** -0.050 ** -0.570*** -0.332**  
Satisfaction with state of economy in country 0.244*** 0.643*** ** 0.615*** 0.412***  0.477*** 0.916*** *** 0.474*** 0.325**  0.377*** 0.053 ** 
Tolerance: Immigrants make country a better place to live 0.300*** 0.368***  0.312*** 0.250***  0.279*** 0.226***  0.208** 0.246***  0.218** 0.040 * 
Victim of burglary or assault in the last 5 years -0.036 -0.218*** * -0.059 -0.097 
 -
0.243*** -0.217** 
 -0.228*** -0.213*** 
 -0.112 -0.241*** 
 
Worked in civic organisation or association in last 12 months 0.222** 0.382***  0.112 -0.019  0.108 0.155  -0.039 0.008  -0.048 0.030  
Gender (1=Men,0=Women) 0.102 -0.018  -0.100 0.132* ** -0.143* -0.018  -0.185** 0.088 *** 0.063 -0.003  
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Before the crisis, there were virtually no differences between the categories of the 
variable “main source of household income”. Only pensioners were less trusting of 
other people and the self-employed showed more trust in the police. During the crisis, 
trust among the self-employed in the Parliament and Legal System fell. In contrast, trust 
among pensioners in Parliament rose. Furthermore, in this last period individuals living 
on social assistance seemed to show less trust in Parliament than did the employed and 
those living on their investments, while the others showed less trust in the Police. 
 
The parameters associated with the contract duration variables did not show any 
statistically significant differences before and during the crisis. However, the population 
without a contract, compared with those on unlimited contracts, reported less trust in 
other people and more trust in the political parties. Furthermore, in both periods those 
without a contract continued to show less trust in the Police than was shown by those 
with contracts. The effect of the variable “Satisfaction with state of the country’s 
economy” is positive and significant for almost all the dependent variables in both 
periods, but less so in 2012 for “Trust in the Police”. Furthermore, the effect of this 
variable on interpersonal trust and trust in the Political Parties increases significantly 
during the economic crisis, and decreases for trust in the Police. Conversely, the effect 
on institutions such as Parliament and the Legal System does not change, while trust 
levels fall in the case of the police.  
 
In general, economic uncertainty is inversely related to satisfaction with the economy 
and presents links with the variables “Main source of household income” and 
“Employment contract duration”. Taking into account that economic uncertainty during 
the economic crisis in Spain had a strong effect on the self-employed, the overall results 
related to the effect of these variables illustrate how economic uncertainly negatively 
affects levels of interpersonal and institutional trust. The estimated parameters 
associated with the variable “Tolerance: Immigrants make country a better place to 
live”, which captures the existence of shared social values, are positive and statistically 
significant. This parameter only changes between 2004 and 2012 when the dependent 
variable is “Trust in the Police”. In this specific case, during the crisis, the parameter is 
not significant. As for social cohesion, captured by the indicator “Victim of burglary or 
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assault in the last 5 years”, the signs of the estimated parameters are, as expected, 
negative. In the case of levels of trust in Parliament, the parameters are not significant in 
either period, that is, before and during the crisis. We observe statistically significant 
changes between 2004 and 2012 only for levels of trust in other people. Here, distrust is 
more acute during the economic crisis. Finally, the indicator “Worked in civic 
organisation or association in last 12 months” has a positive and significant effect on 
interpersonal trust, and does not vary between 2004 and 2012. For the rest of the trust 
levels, the estimated parameters were not significant. 
 
 
Discussion 
If we examine the data as a whole, it can be seen that during the crisis in Spain, 
socioeconomic factors gained in relative weight compared to other factors in terms of 
explaining interpersonal and (to a lesser extent) institutional trust. In 2004, at a time of 
economic growth, trust in other people depended primarily on individual-level 
variables, such as age and a high level of education. General satisfaction with the 
economy, tolerance or participation in civil society were also positive and significant 
factors, but they presented lower values, while the socioeconomic variables appear to 
have been of little significance. The onset of the crisis, however, completely inverted 
this relationship. In 2012, sociodemographic factors lost part of their significance and 
the economic indicators gained in relevance. At that date, the strongest factor 
accounting for interpersonal trust was satisfaction with the way the economy worked. In 
contrast, having to face socioeconomic difficulties and being unemployed led to an 
erosion of trust in others. The deterioration in social cohesion (measured by crime 
victimisation) also increased levels of distrust. Thus, economic wellbeing and economic 
malaise become more decisive factors in accounting for varying levels of interpersonal 
trust.  
 
Before the crisis, trust in Parliament, the representative institution par excellence, was 
relatively independent of the citizens’ socio-demographical status (except for age and 
religiosity) and of an individual’s economic situation. Only the perception of the 
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economy had a certain role to play. This suggests that political trust depends mostly on 
institutional performance (Torcal 2014; Armingcon and Ceka 2013). After 2012, the 
economic disadvantages faced by many citizens did not lead to significant changes. 
Distrust in Parliament only increased among the self-employed, whereas trust grew 
among pensioners. The perception of the state of the economy continues to be 
important. Holding a conservative political ideology and, to some extent, religiosity are 
the only socio-demographic variables that gained in relevance. In sum, satisfaction with 
the economy and ideological factors account for the changes in parliamentary trust. 
Moreover, during the crisis, the population’s confidence in the political parties became 
increasingly conditional on their perception of the state of the economy as the sole 
explanatory factor. 
 
In the case of the normative institutions, the pattern is reversed. Before the recession, 
the legal system was called in to question by the young and those living with financial 
difficulties, working without a contract, or dissatisfied with the general economic 
situation. In short, economic marginalisation led to feelings of distrust in the legal order. 
During the crisis, distrust among the young and the most disadvantaged social groups 
waned, but it rose among the more advantaged (i.e. those living on investments and 
small autonomous entrepreneurs). Thus, the law was increasingly seen as an element of 
protection among the former, and as an element of risk among the latter. The case of the 
police is similar: before the economic crisis, those who were most distrustful of the 
police were groups in economically and contractually marginal situations. However, 
during the crisis, the main detractors of the police became the privileged few living off 
their rents who felt they were being overly persecuted by the Treasury. Satisfaction with 
the economy no longer seemed to be a guarantee of trust in the police.  
 
In conclusion, the economic crisis appears to have shifted some of the foundations of 
interpersonal and institutional trust. The bases of interpersonal trust have clearly moved 
from sociodemographic to economic questions, as most of the disadvantaged have seen 
their trust in others eroded. At the same time, the individual’s personal economic 
situation does not fully account for the loss of institutional trust. But, among certain 
22 
social groups, especially the self-employed, feelings of distrust in parliament and the 
legal system have grown.  
 
If we examine the explanatory factors in more detail, Table 4 demonstrates that the 
increase in situations of socioeconomic difficulty have had a dual effect. On the one 
hand, trust in individuals fell among those sectors of society hit hardest by the economic 
crisis. In contrast, levels of interpersonal trust and trust in political parties rose among 
those who reported being satisfied with the economy. Overall, trust in the political 
institutions appears to be more strongly linked to a general perception of the economy 
than it is to an individual’s personal economic situation. Note, however, that only 6% of 
the total population expressed feeling satisfied with the economic situation in 2012. On 
the other hand, we observe a certain process of polarisation of attitudes towards the 
institutions among certain economic groups, such as the self-employed and the 
pensioners. 
 
During the crisis, trust in the political institutions was eroded more than it was in the 
legal institutions. Trust in Parliament fell among the self-employed, but increased 
among pensioners. What these groups have in common is precisely the perception that 
their situations are directly affected by Parliamentary decisions (negatively, in the case 
of the first group; positively, in that of the second). This reinforces the institutionalist 
belief that attitudes towards the institutions depend on the extent to which different 
groups are exposed to and impacted by the decisions the institutions take. It also 
explains how, with the onset of the economic crisis, trust in the legal system and in the 
police was eroded significantly among the most economically better off social groups 
(e.g., landlords, investors) who felt harassed by a system that imposed tighter tax and 
profit controls. However, the opposite was the case with the more disadvantaged 
sectors. This general idea is further strengthened if we take into consideration the fact 
that the few people who claimed to be satisfied with the state of the economy also 
expressed higher levels of trust in the political parties than did the rest of the population. 
These findings bring to mind the system of political clientelism. 
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Cultural theories emphasise the long-term importance of attitudes and social values in 
accounting for trust (Uslaner 2002; Brehm and Rahn 1997). In line with this claim, in 
our model, the indicator of tolerance of immigration has a significant effect in 
explaining almost all types of trust before and during the crisis. At the global level, the 
total volume of those who stated that “immigration makes a country a better place to 
live” hardly changed between 2004 and 2012, and remained at above 40% of the 
population. A classic indicator of social cohesion is the level of criminal victimisation 
in a community (Halpern 2001; Walklate 1998). The victims of robberies barely 
changed their attitude towards institutions between 2004 and 2012. However, 
victimisation during the crisis did result in a loss of trust in others. With the crisis, 
factors of civic insecurity and socioeconomic vulnerability interacted as they had never 
done so before.8  
 
In the literature, the existence of a strong and mobilised civil society is associated with 
greater trust (Putnam 1993; Brehn and Rahn 1997). In Spain as a whole, the proportion 
of people working in civic associations increased four percentage points during the 
crisis, from 18% in 2004 to 22% of the population in 2013. This slight increase went 
hand-in-hand with a change in the profile of individuals performing such tasks, as well 
as a change in the problems, originating from the crisis, that they addressed. In our data, 
civic participation was found to have no significant effect on levels of institutional trust, 
neither before nor during the crisis. However, participation did have a positive effect on 
interpersonal trust before the crisis, and this effect was strengthened a little as the crisis 
ran its course. This fact, together with the finding that civic participation increased 
while trust in institutions fell, could indicate greater self-management on the part of the 
citizenry. People begin to organize themselves on the margins of those institutions that 
they perceive as failing to offer solutions to their problems. Given that the victims of the 
crisis are those with the lowest levels of trust both in other people and in representative 
institutions, the active incorporation of these groups into the tertiary sector would be 
desirable, as a means to improve social cohesion. 
 
                                                          
8 The same effects are also generated in a context in which victimisation rates are slightly lower 
during the crisis (Torrente 2015). 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to examine the effect of socioeconomic difficulties on levels 
of interpersonal and institutional trust in the context of a severe economic recession. To 
do so, the case of Spain in the 2008 crisis was selected for analysis. Out initial 
hypothesis was that, under these circumstances, economic factors become more 
significant than other factors in explaining levels of trust, because of rising 
socioeconomic inequality and the accompanying polarisation of attitudes. To test this 
hypothesis, we devised a multivariate Probit model of five equations, which we 
replicated both before and during the crisis. Our data were drawn from the European 
Social Survey. 
 
Our results show that the economic crisis modified the factors that define trust in Spain, 
and that socioeconomic variables played an important role in some of the changes seen. 
In the case of interpersonal trust – which increased slightly across the whole population 
when measured at a global level, the analysis shows that the most disadvantaged and 
least disadvantaged by the crisis presented diametrically opposed behaviours. Thus, 
those that were hit hardest by its consequences (e.g., through low incomes and 
unemployment) saw their trust in each other eroded. Indeed, their reported satisfaction 
with the state of the economy became the variable that best explained their levels of 
interpersonal trust. Socioeconomic inequality resulted in a polarisation of attitudes 
towards other people, undermining the foundations of social cohesion. Civic insecurity 
increased the vulnerability of the worst affected groups and weakened interpersonal 
trust further. However, participation in civil society was found to play a certain 
corrective role. 
 
Trust in institutions (in particular, the country’s representative institutions) declined 
dramatically in the course of the crisis. However, the factors that account for the 
citizens’ trust in political and legal institutions behave differently. Satisfaction with and 
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trust in institutions increasingly came to depend on the perception that distinct social 
groups (most notably, pensioners, workers without contract and the self-employed) had 
of whether these institutions’ actions were favourable, or not, to their interests. Here, 
economic variations at the personal level appear to underlie some of the attitudinal 
changes observed. For example, the self-employed became more critical of Parliament, 
while those that live off their rents and investments expressed significantly less trust in 
the legal system and in the police. In contrast, some of the less advantaged groups (the 
unemployed and those living with economic difficulties) expressed greater trust in the 
legal institutions as they felt they afforded them greater protection from the effects of 
the crisis. In short, we find increasingly differentiated levels of institutional trust 
between groups that have been affected by the crisis in quite distinct ways. In this 
respect, their perception of the performance of institutions, which is the main 
underlying explanatory variable, is conditioned by this fact. 
 
All in all, the data analysed here allow us to confirm, in part, our initial hypothesis. 
Against the backdrop of the far-reaching economic crisis, the power of socioeconomic 
factors to account for interpersonal trust rises, primarily owing to the deterioration in 
the individuals’ personal economy. Indeed, a person’s current economic situation seems 
to have a stronger impact than any future uncertainty. The outcome is a process marked 
by the general polarisation of attitudes in which an individual’s economic situation 
plays a key role. Yet, our findings suggest that the deterioration of an individual’s 
personal economy plays a less important role in the erosion of institutional trust and the 
polarisation of attitudes towards these institutions. This said, however, the general 
perception of the functioning of the economy maintains an important role. Indeed, the 
fall in levels of trust recorded in Spain has been notoriously dramatic. Without calling 
into question the importance of institutional performance in levels of institutional trust, 
our research contributes new perspectives to the existing literature. First, the marked 
deterioration in the domestic economies of certain disadvantaged groups has had major 
consequences in terms of their levels of interpersonal trust. Second, the socioeconomic 
deterioration has resulted in different impacts on institutional trust. Overall, the 
relationship between personal economic difficulties and trust in political institutions is 
not a determining factor; yet, it is a factor that clearly affects the attitudes of some 
groups. On the other hand, legal institutions are perceived as a protective factor by the 
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more disadvantaged against the worst effects of the crisis, but as something of a threat 
by the more privileged. Yet, the perception of the overall state of the economy is 
important for all types of institutional trust, indicating that, in short, the economy 
matters for trust. 
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